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Are Assessments for Generic Advertising Optimal if  
Products are Differentiated? 
 
Abstract 
An analytical framework where consumers display preferences for various qualities of an 
agricultural commodity is used to investigate the producer welfare effects of generic 
advertising assessments.  Depending upon the degree of product differentiation present in the 
final goods, some producers are shown to benefit more than others from the use of an 
equivalent assessment on all producers.  This paper delineates those cases where producer 
assessments should be equal and where assessments should be different to insure an equitable 
benefit. 
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Are Assessments for Generic Advertising Optimal if  
Products are Differentiated? 
 
Introduction 
There is increasing debate on the distribution of benefits in marketing orders for generic 
advertising.  In fact, a recent session at the 2001 ASSA meetings in New Orleans was entirely 
devoted to this issue.  Distribution questions permeate the ongoing litigation surrounding 
generic advertising (Crespi & Sexton).  Surprisingly, while the producers at the front lines of 
these battles consistently point to growing differences in varieties and qualities in the 
advertised commodities as affecting the distribution of benefits,  the academic discussion has 
given only slight acknowledgement to these issues.  Here is what Mike Gallo, CEO of Joseph 
Gallo Farms said about generic advertisements that he and other cheese producers are 
compelled to fund under the California dairy marketing order, “We’re trying to differentiate 
ourselves from other products with quality...  They’re saying all cheese is the same and it’s 
not” (Hood, p.  F3).  Likewise, Dan Gerawin who joined other producers to challenge the 
generic advertising marketing orders for peaches, plums, and nectarines charges, “We’re 
doing everything we can to differentiate ourselves.  Yet we have to pay into a fund that 
advertises that all peaches and plums are the same.  A generic message, we feel, definitely 
hurts us” (Savage and Groves, A26). 
Generic advertising has become an increasingly difficult issue for courts around the 
country as producers opposed to generic advertising have claimed that the advertising 
assessments are used in ways that benefit some producers more than others.  For example, in 
both a 1997 U.S. Supreme Court case concerning the generic advertising of peaches and 
nectarines (Glickman vs. Wileman), and a 2001 U.S. Supreme Court case involving generic 
advertising for fresh mushrooms (United Foods vs. USDA), producers argued that generic 
advertising assessments unfairly benefited some producers over others.  The mushroom case,   4 
which at this writing is yet to be decided, will prove especially interesting as one of the key 
arguments was that today’s mushroom varieties are so distinguishable from each other, and 
satisfy such different consumer tastes and preferences that a truly “generic” advertising 
program is impossible.  If the producers in this case are successful, marketing order programs 
around the country will find themselves having to justify not only their programs, but also 
their assessment choices (Crespi and Sexton). 
  Funding for generic advertising is collected from producers on a per-unit basis; an 
assessment rate that is the same for all producers governed by a given marketing order.  
Nearly every generic advertising program presumes a homogeneous commodity and, indeed, 
in the 1950s when the first marketing orders for generic advertising were promulgated, a 
good argument could be made that the commodity covered by any particular order was 
indeed homogeneous.  In such a case, the benefits to producers from an advertising-induced 
increase in demand are arguably proportional throughout the industry and, thus, a single per-
unit assessment rate is equitable.  However, with the seeming explosion of varieties in the last 
decade and differences in processing techniques, one must ask whether the homogeneous 
commodity model is still applicable for all generic advertising orders?  Figure 1 shows the 
change in major  varieties of six commodities since the 1950s.  In the 1980s and 90s, these six 
commodities also became embroiled in a great deal of litigation over generic advertising.  
Obviously varieties are developed as much for reasons of yield as for differences in c onsumer 
tastes and preferences, however, considering the above complaints by opponents of generic 
advertising, figure 1 is telling. 
If commodities within a marketing order are distinguishable at the consumer level, 
then it should be expected that benefits  from a generic advertising program might not be 
distributed to all producers in the same way.  As such, it is important to ask whether the 
assessment rates supporting a marketing order for a particular commodity should be equal for   5 
all producers of that commodity (as the assessments currently exist) or should be, say, 
proportional to the benefits derived from the program? 
This paper presents a simple, theoretical model that takes product differentiation into 
account in order to compare producer welfare under the current, equivalent producer 
assessment system with a hypothetically  “fair” (or equitable) producer assessment that 
accounts for consumer preferences.
1  In this model, a fair assessment balances each 
producer’s marginal profit gain coming from generic advertising with the marginal cost of the 
assessment.  The policy implications from this simple model are important to the generic 
advertising debate as a proposed fair assessment may help marketing boards avoid costly 
litigation.  
In this model, a case  of horizontal differentiation is considered, where different 
consumers may offer different rankings to the same bundle of goods.  Goods in this model 
may be thought of as different varieties of the same commodity (red, yellow and green 
apples, for example), where the commodity (apples) exists under a generic-advertising 
marketing order.  We show that the current equivalent assessment corresponds to the fair 
assessment under one of two conditions: i) either consumers perceive the varieties to be 
homogeneous  or ii) the varieties are differentiated such that consumers’ preferences are 
symmetric (e.g., the market is fairly evenly split between those consumers preferring one 
variety and consumers preferring the other).  With the exception of these two cases, however, 
a fair assessment must necessarily differ among firms producing different varieties given 
consumers’ asymmetric preferences for differentiated products. 
While there is a fair amount of literature discussing optimal assessments for marketing 
order programs (Nerlove and Waugh; Alston, Carman and Chalfant; Holloway), and there has 
                                                   
1 The authors admit that the use of the word “fair” may be a bit unsettling, and they are open to suggestions for a 
term that will be more acceptable to economists, and especially, to growers.   6 
been a recent interest in distributional questions (see especially Alston, Chalfant and Piggott; 
Chung and Kaiser (2000a and b), Kinnucan and Miao, Suzuki and Kaiser, and Zhang  and 
Sexton) there has been nothing written about optimal assessments in the case of 
heterogeneous varieties covered under the same generic advertising marketing order.   
 
An Advertising Model of Product Differentiation 
The model chosen for this paper is based on a model developed by Hotelling.  In this very 
simple model, there are  N consumers whose location is identified by  x, uniformly distributed 
over [0,1].  Hotelling’s model treated the distribution as a geographically spatial one (the 
location of firms along a beach or roadway, for example), and many subsequent papers have 
kept this geographic dimension.  However, the “location” in our model is not geographic.  
Rather, in this model we interpret the location,  x, of the consumer as indicating a consumer’s 
“ideal product variety,” à la von der Fehr and Stevik (p. 116).   
Consumers may choose between two firms offering varieties that are, in this sense, 
“located” in different places.  We arbitrarily fix one of the firm’s varieties.  Firm 1’s variety 
is located in  v˛[0,1], while firm 2’s variety is located at 1.  The parameter  v captures the 
intensity of the product differentiation and the demand size for both firms.  Thus, the case of 
v=1 corresponds to a situation with  perceived homogeneous products (where  consumers 
perceive no difference between varieties), while the case of  v<1 corresponds to a situation 
under horizontal differentiation (whereby if goods are offered at equal prices, the diversity of 
consumer preferences will cause some buyers to purchase f rom firm 1 and others to choose 
firm 2’s variety).  For simplicity, both firms incur no cost of production and they compete in 
prices (Bertrand competition).
2 
                                                   
2 Producer homogeneity in supply response is assumed in order to focus upon demand heterogeneity.  Our 
results can be extended if we consider a competitive case with an inelastic supply function (see Chung and   7 
There is a “travel cost” so to speak of purchasing the variety offered by one firm if 
that variety is located further away along the continuum from a consumer’s preferred variety.  
The further away that a firm’s variety is from a consumer’s ideal variety, the lower is the 
consumer’s willingness to pay for the offered product.  We assume that this travel cost 
increases at an increasing rate (see Tirole, p. 280).  Specifically, a consumer purchasing a 
variety from firm  i  = 1, 2  incurs a cost of 
2
i d  where  di  is the distance traveled.  Thus a 
consumer of type  x chooses one unit of either variety 1 or variety 2 in order to maximize her 
indirect utility given by  Ui  = u  – p i –  2
i d , where  u is the same for each variety and  pi denotes 
the price selected by seller i.  
Further, following much of the literature on generic advertising, we assume that 
advertising acts as a demand shifter but does not change the slope of the demand curve.  In 
this static game, the producers may not alter the intrinsic quality (e.g., the sugar content, 
color, texture) of their varieties, but they  can augment the number of consumers ready to 
consume the product.  Advertising acts to bring in new consumers.  Let N be defined as the 
number of consumers in the market for both varieties.  Generic advertising increases the size 
of the market such that,  ceteris paribus,  N = n 0 without advertising and  N = n 0  +  n1 with 
generic advertising.  The additional  n1 consumers may be obtained for some fixed cost  A, 
necessary to finance media advertising and other promotions.  Since we are interested in a 
marketing board’s assessment strategy for achieving a certain level of demand, we just look 
at the marginal amount of advertising necessary to augment demand by  n1 additional 
consumers.  In other words, we are unconcerned about an advertising level of A +  B in order 
to bring in, say, some  n1+n2 additional consumers, as this would result in a new assessment 
rate, but would not change the analysis.
3  Further, because generic advertising is promulgated 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kaiser, 2000-a and 2000-b). 
3 Obviously, the case of a more complex technology for the advertising could be considered, where the number 
of new buyers N may entail a fixed cost fN
2/2, with f>0.  This case is being examined as an extension.   8 
in cases where producers feel the market lacks significant branded advertising, we distinguish 
the case of branded advertising from that of generic advertising.  We do show, however, that 
our model does allow us to compare both types of advertising (see Crespi and Marette for a 
model where both generic and branded advertising coexist in the same industry).  One nice 
feature of this model over other models of generic advertising is that the rationale for generic 
advertising (that the industry will provide a sub-optimal level of advertising if left 
unregulated) is actually endogenous to our model rather than simply an assumption. 
Two further assumptions are made, which are also consistent with the implications of 
a marketing order for generic advertising.  First, we assume the marketing cost for either 
variety is the same and we simply set this cost equal to zero.  While this assumption ignores 
seller heterogeneity in supply response, marketing boards implicitly make the same 
assumption when they set their assessments.   Second, when we discuss the effectiveness of 
branded and generic advertising, we assume an identical advertising process that ignores any 
difference in efficiency and/or quality perception between branded and generic advertising.  
While this second assumption may be harder to justify, we do note that some marketing 
orders for generic advertising also implicitly make this assumption through credit-back 
provisions that reimburse producers for partaking in their own branded campaigns.  In other 
words, the assumption underlying a credit-back provision is that advertising is advertising, 
regardless of whether it is branded or generic.  Simply, we do not feel that augmenting our 
model, so that branded advertising is more effective than generic advertising, adds 
significantly to the implications. 
The single round of trading proceeds in two stages.  In stage 1, the choice of whether 
or not to implement advertising,  A, to bring in the additional consumers is taken.  We 
consider two cases in stage 1.  In the first case, the decision to implement  A is made by either 
one or both firms (in the case where no generic advertising exists), while under the second   9 
case the board that administers the marketing order decides whether to implement  A (in the 
case where an industry is regulated under a marketing order for generic advertising).  Before 
proceeding to the second stage of the game, we briefly discuss these two cases in order to 
show why generic advertising is needed in certain industries.  In the game’s second stage, 
producers simultaneously set prices,  p1 and  p2 (Bertrand Competition).  The game is solved 
by backward induction (i.e., subgame perfect equilibrium).   
  For the demand specification,  a critical variable in the product differentiation case is 
the location we denote as  ˆ x, representing the preference location such that a consumer is 
indifferent between purchasing either variety.  The consumer with a preference located at  x 
who purchases a product from firm 1 has an indirect utility equal to 
2
1 ) ( v x p u - - - .  Likewise, 
a consumer purchasing from firm 2 has an indirect utility equal to  2 2 ) 1 ( x p u - - - .  The 
indifferent consumer is one whose indirect utilities from purchasing either variety are equal: 
2
1 () upxv --- =
2
2 (1) upx --- .  Therefore, the location of this indifferent consumer’s 
preference is determined as 






p p v x
-
-
+ + = .   
  Because both prices and varieties differ, demands in the product differentiation case 
are not necessarily equal as in the homogeneous goods case.  Specifically, because 
consumers’  product variety preferences are distributed along the unit interval, the demand for 
variety 1 is  x N p p Q ˆ ) , ( 2 1 1 =  and the demand for variety 2 is  ) ˆ 1 ( ) , ( 2 1 2 x N p p Q - = .  Note that the 
market is always covered (i.e., all consumers purchase one unit) because we restrict our 
attention to the case where 
2
1 () upxv --- >0 and 
2
2 (1) upx --- >0.4  Under this case, the 
overall purchased quantity is  ) , ( 2 1 1 p p Q + N p p Q = ) , ( 2 1 2 .   
                                                   
4 We abstract from the case of a n incompletely covered market, although it should be noted that if  A becomes 
very large, consumption will be reduced because either 
2
1 () upxv --- <0 and/or  2
2
(1) upx --- <0.  However, 
in this case, such an effect would deter a marketing order from implementing any additional advertising.   10 
  Let  1 t  and  2 t  represent the assessments under generic advertising respectively 
incurred by firm 1 and firm 2.  In reality, these assessments are equal for all producers, but 
we allow the possibility of unequal assessments in order to determine the rates that would be 
optimal in a differentiated goods industry.  The profit for firm 1 is  111112 ()(,) ptQpp p =-  
and the profit for the firm 2 is  222212 ()(,) ptQpp p =- .   
  The game is solved by backward induction whereby stage 2 is solved first to obtain 
the firms’ prices in equilibrium.  Using the first-order conditions for profit maximization, the 
Nash equilibrium is given by prices 
*
121 [(1)(3)2]/3 pvvtt =-+++  and 
*
221 [(1)(3)2]/3 pvvtt =--++ .  These prices result in equilibrium quantities of 
*
11221 (,,)[(1)(3)]/[6(1)] QNttNvvttv =-++--  and 
*
21221 (,,)[(1)(3)]/[6(1)] QNttvvttv =---+- .  Likewise, firm profits in equilibrium 
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  Before proceeding to the setting of the assessment rates in stage 1, several points may 
be highlighted in the a bsence of generic advertising, namely with  1 t = 2 t =0.  When  v=0, 
varieties are located at the two extremes of consumers’ preferences (for example, if the good 
were apples, given the prices set by the firms, the market is divided such that half of the 
consumers prefer red apples and half prefer green apples).  Profits in this case, 
*
1(,0,0) N p and 
*
2(,0,0) N p , are equal and positive, because producers have market power 
over a symmetric and differentiated demand due to their extreme locations.  On the other 
hand, when 0<v<1, the profit 
*
1(,0,0) N p is greater than 
*
2(,0,0) N p , because firm 1 is able   11 
to capture more of the demand due to its more centralized position (e.g., if f irm 1 produced 
red apples then if consumers have a stronger preference for red apples, firm 1 benefits from 
this stronger preference).  When v=0, both profits 
*
1(,0,0) N p and 
*
2(,0,0) N p  are equal to 
zero since products are homogeneous (e.g., either because only red apples are offered or 
because consumers perceive no difference between red and green apples). 
  Stage 1 is now detailed by distinguishing branded advertising from generic 
advertising. 
 
The Branded Advertising Case 
We begin  with a discussion of branded advertising in order to show that our model 
encompasses the rationale behind generic advertising, namely, that firms may find 
themselves in a position where a sub-optimal level of advertising exists in an industry.  When 
there  is no advertising, only  0 n N=  buyers make purchases.  In order to increase demand, 
either firm 1 or firm 2 has to pay  A for the advertising that will bring in the  n1 new 
consumers.  Using the profits computed in the previous section with  assessments  1 t  =  2 t =0, 
we obtain the following results.  ( i) If 
**
21020 (,0,0)(,0,0) nnAn pp +-> , then both firms 
have an incentive to pay for the advertising.  At the subgame equilibrium, either firm 1 or 
firm 2 pays for t he branded advertising.  If firm 1 incurs the cost  A, firm 2 will not spend on 
advertising as such spending brings in no more buyers (again, this is due to one of our 
assumptions).  Thus, if firm 1 incurs the cost, profits are 
*
110 (,0,0) nnA p +-  for firm 1 and 
*
210 (,0,0) nn p +  for firm 2 (with the costs reversed if firm 2 incurs the cost of advertising).  
We restrict the rest of this discussion to the cases where firm 1 incurs the cost, though clearly 
the analysis is symmetric.  ( ii) If 
**
21020 (,0,0)(,0,0) nnAn pp +-<  and   12 
**
11010 (,0,0)(,0,0) nnAn pp +->  only firm 1 has an interest in paying for the 
advertising.  Thus, in equilibrium for cases ( i) and (ii), the profits are 
*
110 (,0,0) nnA p +-  
for firm 1 and 
*
201 (,0,0) nn p +  for firm 2.  Firm 2 benefits from the advertising without 
incurring the cost; thus, while all firms benefit from the advertising, the cost is only incurred 
by one firm, hence the incentive for generic advertising in this industry.  ( iii) Finally, for 
**
11010 (,0,0)(,0,0) nnAn pp +-<  no firm i s incited to advertise and profits 
are
*
10 (,0,0) n p  for firm 1 and 
*
20 (,0,0) n p  for firm 2.  Thus, we have established that our 
model can encompass the rationale for generic advertising. 
 
The Generic Advertising Case 
If a sub-optimal l evel of industry advertising exists, an industry may wish to be regulated 
under a marketing order for generic advertising.  The marketing board responsible for 
choosing the advertising level and assessment rates decides whether or not to advertise at a 
cost of  A in order to attract  n1 additional consumers.  If the marketing board incurs the 
amount  A, mandatory assessments on all firms in the industry are imposed to cover this cost.  
The amount of generic advertising and the assessment rates are chosen under the condition 
that A is not only affordable but also that industry profits are at least as high as they would be 
in the absence of generic advertising.  Although in reality, the per-unit assessments for 
generic advertising in a particular marketing order  do not vary by variety (i.e., assessment t1 = 
t2 =  t), we consider this case as well as the hypothetical case where the marketing board may 
choose different assessments.  Thus in the hypothetical case, the board sets a positive 
assessment of t1 on firm 1 and  t2 on firm 2 to finance generic advertising with the objective of 
increasing industry profits. 
   13 
Equivalent Assessment Rates 
First consider the case under equivalent assessment rates,  t1 =  t2 =  t, determined in order to 
maximize the sellers’ joint profit and to cover the fixed cost.  The board chooses  t for 
maximizing the joint profit 
**
110210 (,,)(,,) nnttnntt pp +++  provided that the cost is 
covered, namely, 
**
110210 [(,,)(,,)] tQnnttQnnttA +++‡ , and that the generic advertising 
increases joint profit, namely, 
****
1102101020 (,,)(,,)(,0,0)(,0,0) nnttnnttnn pppp +++>+.   
  The solution of this stage is very simple.  As the market is completely covered, then 
**
11021010 (,,)(,,) QnnttQnnttnn +++=+, which leads via the joint-profit maximization 
condition to an assessment rate of  ) /( 0 1 * n n A t + = .  In other words, if the board chooses an 
equivalent assessment rate, it will maximize industry profits by choosing that per-unit rate 
that just covers advertising costs.  The first column of table 1 presents the assessment rate and 
incremental profit for each firm in this case.  Notice that the sellers’ profits differ for  0<v<1 
but are equivalent in both the homogeneous goods case ( v=1) and the symmetric preferences 
case ( v=0).  Specifically, for  0<v<1, if both firms pay the same assessment rate, firm 1’s 
benefits from the increase in demand are greater than firm 2’s benefits. 
 
Different Assessment Rates 
With the exception, then, of the homogeneous goods case and the symmetric preferences 
case, there is no reason that the assessment rates need be equivalent.  But, if goods are not 
homogeneous what is the objective of the marketing board?  Noting that a marketing order 
for generic advertising cartelizes the advertising decisions of an industry, perhaps a board’s 
goal should be to simply maximize industry joint profits.  However, it is w orth noting that 
Schmalensee has shown that the maximization of industry joint profit is inadequate when   14 
firms are heterogeneous.  Alston, Chalfant and Piggott and Chung and Kaiser ask this same 
question if firm sizes differ.  One possible answer is that a  board should, indeed, maximize 
joint industry profits and then, using a Kaldor-Hicks criteria, redistribute the gains.  Clearly, 
the practicality of such a requirement is daunting.  Thus, in light of the political charge of 
marketing orders for generic advertising that no firm be advantageously promoted over 
another (1954 AMAA amendment), we turn to the question of whether there is another type 
of assessment choice that would increase industry profits such that the marginal benefits are 
equivalent to all firms?   
  Here it is assumed that the board may choose a “fair” assessment in order that both 
firms receive the same marginal benefit from the  n1  additional consumers.  This fair 
assessment is determined such that the objective constraint,  
 
(i)    
****
21012201101210 (,,)(,0,0)(,,)(,0,0) nnttnnnttn pppp +-=+-   
 
and the budget constraint,  
 
(ii)    
**
111012221012 (,,)(,,) tQnntttQnnttA +++‡   
 
are both satisfied.  Constraint ( i) leads to the relationship  t1 =  t2 + v(1–v).  The replacement of 
this equality in the budget constraint ( ii), leads to the assessments and the profits given in the 
second column of table 1.5 
 
                                                   
5 Note that under our demand specification, the result is the same if the objective function (i) is replaced by an 
objective function ( i') given by 
**
2101211012 (,,)(,,) nnttnntt pp +=+  that takes into account equivalent 
profits.  In this sense, all the collusive solutions that depend on the producers’ bargaining power (see 
Schmalensee) may be extended to our problem.  In particular, the two-thirds majority voting rule that puts a   15 
A Comparison of the Two Assessment Mechanisms 
With solutions under both types of assessments derived, we now turn to a discussion of the 
added gains from the increased consumers,  n1, and the effects on both firms under the two 
assessment policies.  In table 1, the equivalent assessment policy (in the first column) is the 
current one where product homogeneity is implied (whether or not it is assumed) and the 
assessments are set equally for both firms at  A/N.   If, however, varieties are differentiated in 
consumers’ minds but the marketing board had chosen the same assessment rate for both 
firms (perhaps because of an assumption of homogeneous varieties, i.e., an erroneous 
assumption that  v=1), then the benefits from the increased demand are not equally shared.  As 
table 1 shows, unless consumer preferences are equally split between the two varieties ( v=0) 
or the two firms produce the same variety (v=1), then if both firms face the same assessment 
rate, firm 1 benefits more than firm 2 from the increased demand under product 
differentiation.   
  On the other hand, the “fair” assessment policy is that where the assessment rates take 
product differentiation into account.  The parameter  v indicates the intensity of firm 1’s 
preference advantage.  For 0<v<1/2, a fair assessment rate 
*
2 t  decreases with  v, while 
*
1 t  
increases with  v (because market share increases for firm 1).  The converse is true for 
1/2<v<1 (as  v increases, competition becomes more intense due to converging consumer 
preferences).  Notice that the optimal assessment rate is not just a function of market share; 
the intensity of competition is also an important factor. 
  The fair assessment rates insure that both the  marginal demand and marginal profit 
from the additional consumers are equally shared between the two firms.  Note that when 
firms are symmetric under product differentiation, namely  v=0, both assessment rates are 
equivalent with 
**
12 / ttAN == .  A lso notice that, as discussed above for  v=1, when products 
                                                                                                                                                             
marketing order in place may be reinterpreted under a Schmalensee-type approach.   16 
are homogeneous, the gains to both firms from the additional consumers are symmetric and, 
again, 
**
12 / ttAN == .   
  The reader will also notice that the equivalent assessment actually leads to a higher 
joint profit.  However, unless a Kaldor-Hicks mechanism for redistributing gains exists, the 
benefit of the fair assessment rate is that tensions among sellers are diminished as incremental 
profits are equivalent and further disputes stemming from any reallocation of welfare gains 
are avoided.  Given the contentious history of generic advertising battles (Crespi and Sexton), 
the fair assessment would help avoid costly and bitter trials in an industry because the charge 
that one firm benefits more than another is no longer valid.  
   
Extensions 
Implications for Branded Advertising.  
We may compare profits in the case of generic advertising with those under branded 
advertising.  Again, we limit our consideration here to the case under our (perhaps 
unrealistically strong) assumption that private and generic advertising are equally beneficial.  
Under such an assumption, relative to private advertising, producers will benefit from generic 
advertising (under both fair and equivalent assessments) because the per-unit assessment cost 
is passed on to consumers.  As there is no consumption reduction because the study is 
restricted to cases with 
2
1 () upxv --- >0 and 
2
2 (1) upx --- >0, generic advertising is 
always implemented.  With the equivalent assessment, firm 1 benefits from generic 
advertising compared to branded advertising, while firm 2’s profit remains unchanged.  With 
the fair assessment, firm 1 benefits from generic advertising compared to branded advertising 
if 
2 (6)/18 Avv <+ , while firm 2’s situation is always improved under the fair assessment.  
Marketing orders that compel generic advertising are based on the idea that the free-rider 
effect results in a sub-optimal amount of generic advertising for the industry.  Thus,   17 
compelling growers to provide for generic advertising will increase profits for the entire 
industry even in a context of product differentiation and branded advertising.  Again, this 
result is partly driven by our assumption of the effectiveness of generic advertising compared 
to branded advertising.  A more complete analysis should take into account the potentially 
greater efficiency of branded advertising (see Crespi and Marette). 
 
Vertical Product Differentiation.   
This simple framework underlined the r ole of different assessments corresponding to 
heterogeneous demands.  The methodology may also be applied under vertical 
differentiation.  In such a case, a “fair” assessment systematically leads to a greater 
assessment rate for the high-quality firm.  The difference between vertical differentiation and, 
what is called, horizontal differentiation in the model just outlined, is that all consumers have 
the same preference ranking in cases of vertical product differentiation.  Under vertical 
differentiation, i f both goods were offered at the same price, all consumers would purchase 
one of the goods (i.e., the higher quality good).  When  v>1, the model may be used to 
examine the case of vertical differentiation.  Under this case, for equal prices,  p1 and  p2, all 
buyers will choose firm 2’s variety, which we construct to represent the preferred variety.  
For different prices, there is a tradeoff between consumer’s preferences for higher quality and 
the cost savings that come from purchasing a less desirable good.   Demands are found as 
above using the indifferent consumer with a preference location  ˆ x.  In the vertical product 
differentiation model, the demand for firm 1’s good is then  ) ˆ 1 ( x N -  and the demand facing 
firm 2 is  x Nˆ with v > 1.   
  Under equivalent assessments, the benefits of the increased demand are never equal 
for the two qualities, with the high-quality variety always receiving higher benefits in relation 
to the assessment paid.  (Note there is  no such necessary disproportional benefit under   18 
horizontal differentiation.)  A fair assessment rate developed under this vertical 
differentiation case reveals that the firm with the higher quality product should be paying a 
higher assessment rate than the firm producing a lower quality product.  The fair assessment 
rate increases (respectively decreases) for the high-quality sellers (respectively low-quality 
sellers) with  v as soon as  v>1.  In the case of vertical differentiation, the fair assessments are 
always different (while under horizontal differentiation, recall the fair assessments are equal 
for  v=0 or  v=1).  The implications of this finding may be startling to some growers who are 
trying to differentiate their product from lower-quality products.  Our model shows that 
growers of high-quality products must necessarily pay more in assessments since they receive 
more of the benefits from an increase in generic advertising. 
 
Choosing the Actual Assessment 
We are currently extending this model to an econometric application of the marketing order 
for California Table Grapes in order to determine the “fair” assessment rates based upon 
consumer preferences for different varieties of grapes.  In this extension, we will use data 
gathered in part by Alston  et a l. in a 1997 study of the generic advertising expenditures of the 
California Table Grape Commission (CTGC).  California table grapes sold for the fresh 
market make for an interesting analysis for the following reasons.  First, table grapes are 
horizontally differentiated, that is, consumers have preferences for different varieties that are 
not based solely upon relative prices.  Secondly, the CTGC has been involved in an ongoing 
battle with certain producers over the legalities of the generic advertising programs.  Thirdly, 
there is virtually no branded advertising for table grapes sold on the fresh market.  For these 
three reasons, we feel table grapes will provide a nice case study for the model developed in 
this paper. 
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Conclusion 
The simple model in this paper is used to answer a question that has heretofore been 
neglected in research on commodity promotion.  Namely, we address the issue of whether 
assessments for generic advertising should differ if products covered under a particular 
marketing program  are differentiated.  The simple framework presented here, based upon 
assumptions that are consistent with generic advertising programs, shows that the current 
equivalent assessment mechanism used by marketing boards should be re-examined. 
Specifically, we  show that only under two conditions should assessment rates be 
equivalent.  The first condition would be if consumers perceive no difference in the varieties 
offered (i.e., consumers truly believe the goods are homogeneous).  The second condition 
would be  if consumers’ preferences were such that the market is, essentially, evenly split 
among varieties.  With the exception of these two conditions, an equivalent assessment 
results in a producer of one variety benefiting more than a producer of another variety (which 
is consistent with the complaints raised by some growers in this last decade’s bout of generic 
advertising litigation).  We also show that it is possible for a “fair” assessment mechanism to 
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Figure 1 :  Change in Composition of Major Varieties for Selected Commodities Involved in 
Generic Advertising Challenges in the 1990s. 
Source: California Agricultural Statistics Service. 
 
Table 1 – Equilibrium Profits under Alternative Assessment Rates. 
  Equivalent Assessment Rates  Fair Assessment Rates 
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